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New Technologies and Moral Duties: Valuing the Person as a Means to an End 
 
SHAWN H. E. HARMON 
School of Law, University of Edinburgh 
 
Morality in a Technological World: Knowledge as Duty, by Lorenzo Magnani, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, 288 pp., US$90.00 
 
Many of us will be familiar with Kant’s ethical imperative, which states that 
we must act only in such a way that we might at the same time accept that it should 
become a universal law.  And many of us will be equally familiar with Kant’s related 
proposition that, as he puts it: 
 
[M]an, and in general every rational being exists as an end in himself 
and not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must 
in all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational 
beings, always be viewed at the same time as an end. (Kant, 1785: 95) 
 
Relying on rationality and moral agency, Kant separated out humans from other 
things and posited that they deserve special treatment, saying that persons, because of 
their nature are ends in themselves and cannot be arbitrarily treated.  In essence, to 
treat someone solely as a ‘means’ is to ‘instrumentalise’ that person inappropriately 
and to so instrumentalise someone is to act immorally (toward them). 
Although there are obviously other important moral theories, it is arguable that 
none have been more persuasive or influential than Kant’s in the 21st century setting 
of medical treatments, biotechnologies and other new technologies, and this is 
evidenced by its often explicit adoption in the human rights paradigm, which has 
become so dominant (even if its most important instruments are just as often observed 
in the breach as in the realisation).  Consider, for example, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the 
Council of Europe’s Biomedicine Convention (1997), UNESCO’s Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997), and others. 
The notion of human dignity is also central to the ethical theory Magnani sets 
out in Morality in a Technological World.  The book responds to two troubling facts 
in particular: the all-too-frequent absence of respect for human dignity; and an 
increasingly dehumanised social setting, which Magnani describes as having a 
‘ubiquitous technological presence’ through which human behaviour (and the human-
generated technosphere) can have a tremendous impact on the world (pp. xiii & 8).  
By way of example, he cites overpopulation and new biotechnologies and their 
consequences, which include ozone depletion, noxious gas production, biodiversity 
destruction and genetic mutation.  He claims that this modern techno-culture raises 
unique moral issues (from ecological rescue, to biotech safety, to human 
hybridisation, to cyberprivacy) and duties (the ultimate one being to respect human 
dignity). 
Magnani’s theory is exceptional, however, in that he turns the anti-
instrumentalisation discourse of human dignity on its head.  Citing the wildlife 
preservation context as an example, he says: 
 
[T]here is a continuous delegation of moral values to externalities; this 
may … cause some people to complain that wildlife [for example] 
receives greater moral and legal protection than, for example, 
disappearing cultural traditions.  I wondered what reasoning process 
would result in a nonhuman thing’s being valued over a living, breathing 
person and asked … what might be done to elevate the status of human 
beings.  One solution … is to re-examine the respect we have developed 
for particular externalities and then to use those things as a vehicle to 
return value to people. (p. x) 
 
In short, Magnani offers the radical suggestion that human beings can and should be 
treated as ‘things’ (a traditionally disparaged proposition), and can thus come to be 
respected as things that have, in the modern world, been ascribed more value than 
(some) people.  By doing so, he claims that we can ‘re-appropriate’ the moral esteem 
that we have ‘lavished’ on external things/objects such as endangered species, works 
of art, information and information systems.  An integral element of this approach, he 
says, is to recognise that our modern techno- and knowledge-based world imposes on 
us a duty to produce and apply ethical knowledge in keeping with scientific 
knowledge.  One duty, grounded on Platonic conceptions, is to produce more 
knowledge, and thereby aid in the avoidance of wrong-doing through ignorance.  The 
other duty is to use this knowledge to effect positive change in the world (i.e. improve 
the lives of humans who suffer).  Indeed, through his engagement with, and inversion 
of, the Kantian-inspired debates around instrumentalisation, Magnani contributes to a 
growing body of work concerned with the discovery, recognition and imposition of 
duties (as opposed to individualistic rights) in the healthcare context (O’Neil, 2002, 
Harris, 2005, Harmon, 2006).  The other main argument is that morality must match 
the dynamism of the technological setting to which it is being applied.  Morality is not 
observed, it is performed and interactive; a claim that is also finding more and more 
support (O’Malley et al., 2007).  
Magnani begins by exploring the idea that humans and nonhuman things are 
co-dependent, and people can and should be respected as ‘things’ of value.  As the 
basis of his argument, he claims that people are information- and knowledge-carriers 
and might be valued as such (p. 28).  Moreover, he argues that humans are deeply 
integrated with these information artefacts (and other nonhuman objects).  Humans 
and nonhumans are ‘folded into’ one another insofar as we delegate action to external 
things (objects, tools, artefacts) that thereby share our human existence with us; we 
experience ‘an exchange of human and nonhuman properties’ which causes a ‘mixing 
up of objectivity and subjectivity’ (p.25).  Given that this state is the hallmark of the 
modern ‘civilised life’, the characterisation of ‘people as means’ is all the more 
appropriate and helpful. 
In chapter 2, drawing on Robin Baker, Tom Beauchamp, John Harris, and 
Bonnie Steinbock, Magnani explores some of the moral issues and arguments 
surrounding reproductive technologies (particularly IVF) as well as various other 
(soon-to-exist) medical technologies (reproductive cloning, cortical micro-electrodes, 
and so on), many of which evince at least a tacit acceptance of organic and inorganic 
marriages for curative purposes.  In rehearsing these arguments and technological 
possibilities, Magnani seeks to demonstrate that humans are increasingly integrated 
with nonhuman artefacts and technical processes, and are therefore deserving of a 
new understanding (p.42 at note 4).  His overall purpose is to demonstrate that it is 
moral to recognise people – who are increasingly human-artefact hybrids – as 
‘things’.  Indeed, given the pace and direction of technology, there is an increasingly 
urgent need for people to be ‘respected as things’. 
Chapter 3 commences from the proposition that knowledge in the 
technological age has become a much more important duty than ever before because 
of the profound consequences it can have on our wellbeing and dignity. (Magnani, 
2007, 65)  Scientific knowledge allows us to understand better the external events of 
nature (and to develop artefacts that serve us within that environment), and moral 
knowledge helps us to anticipate better what artefacts might jeopardise our dignity.  
As such, we must be committed to knowledge-generation, for knowledge shapes how 
and what we think, makes possible intentionality and free will, heightens 
consciousness and makes possible the realisation of dignity (p.91). 
In chapter 4, Magnani makes the case for knowledge generation and 
dissemination as a means of encouraging creative, model-based, ‘manipulative ethical 
abduction’ (i.e. discovering new ideas and theories by manipulating external objects 
and representations as is done in the scientific realm) (pp.93-118 & 184-197), 
particularly around ‘moral mediators’ (‘entities we can construct in order to bring 
about certain ethical effects [and which] ... may exist as beings, objects or structures 
…’) (p.248).  However, he cautions that judgments must be made about the quality 
and type of information considered morally valuable, and to that end, he explores 
some of the moral issues that are implicated by our informational capabilities in the 
Cyber Age.  He states that information technologies are increasingly ubiquitous, are 
compounding our hybridisation, and are threatening human dignity in more insidious 
ways than the reproductive technologies discussed in chapter 2. Though greatly 
valued, they can be immoral through their erosion of privacy, which is fundamental to 
human freedom and intimacy (and therefore dignity).  If dignity is to flourish in this 
new, informational environment, we must interrogate some of the internal conditions 
which erode it. 
Thus, chapter 5 explores our personal relationship with knowledge and the 
part that relationship plays in determining the level of freedom we enjoy.  It is 
premised on the belief that people frequently deny the fact that choice exists; they 
create a simple world in which there are no alternatives so as to shield themselves 
from the responsibility and anxiety of difficult decision-making – they self-delude and 
thereby commit ‘bad faith’ insofar as decisions are externalised and limited. (p.129)  
They thus artificially reduce their own freedom and that of others who are affected by 
their actions (or inactions).  Magnani concludes that living without important 
information – whether we have resisted it or are unaware of it – is to create a ‘toxic 
state of ignorance’ which feeds ‘bad faith’ and leads to poor decisions and a corrosion 
of wellbeing. (Magnani, 2007, 160) 
In the final two chapters, Magnani shifts focus, offering the methodological 
foundation associated with the moral reasoning/deliberation he is espousing.  In 
chapter 6, he contends that morality is the effort to guide one’s conduct by reasons 
(i.e. to do what there are the best reasons for doing while giving weight to the interests 
of individuals affected by the conduct).  As such, we need to develop sound principles 
for choosing actions and appropriate ways of reasoning that permit us to apply them 
so as to facilitate ‘moral coherence’, which, in turn, helps us to explore the 
multidimensional character of ethical problems.  To that end, he suggests 
‘manipulative abduction’ (highlighted above).  In chapter 7, he challenges casuistry 
and attempts to illustrate that ‘abduction’ (i.e. reasoning to hypotheses) is central to 
ethical deliberation insofar as it demonstrates that judgments, especially those in 
complicated scenarios, do not always derive from rigid, well-established principles.  
Rather, they often come from verbal argument that takes into account particular 
circumstances, precedents and exceptions.  This, of course, is particularly the case in 
techno-settings where advances create unforeseen challenges (pp.215-240). 
Ultimately, Magnani’s theory can be characterised as a ‘combination of ethics, 
epistemology, and cognitive science’, and he sums up by stating: 
 
I am convinced that moral concerns involve reasoning that bears 
important parallels to reasoning in the sciences and that these similarities 
can help us to address the problem of moral deliberation in cases and 
problems not anticipated by moral philosophers. (p.248) 
 
Magnani claims that our modern (technological) capabilities impose greater 
efforts of foresight (and the generation of information to facilitate that foresight) than 
ever before, arguing that ethical behaviour requires that we assume long-range duties 
commensurate with the scope of our powers (p. 95).  While this argument is generally 
sensible and well-founded, one must be cognizant of the limitations related to 
horizon-gazing (Williams, 2006). 
Additionally, Magnani encourages us to find new ways to integrate morality 
and the modern world (i.e. to increase the effectiveness of morality in modern 
contexts), and he does this by instrumentalising the person, transforming them into an 
informational artefact.  This prompts two thoughts.  First, one can certainly appreciate 
the desire to better integrate and invigorate morality, though one might not be as 
convinced as Magnani that existing ethical theories are not up to the task of evaluating 
behaviour and pointing it in the proper direction.  We probably need simply to heed 
what evidence and rationality are telling us; it is not so much a failure of existing 
ethical theories that has brought us to where we are, but rather a failure of actors to act 
within known (or knowable) moral parameters.  The formulation of a wholly new 
theory will not change that human shortcoming.  Second, while his approach – 
instrumentalising the person – recognises and tries to capture some of the value we 
have attributed to technological artefacts and innovations, it is an approach fraught 
with danger.  It assumes (or relies on the assumption) that we all hold artefacts and 
technologies in high regard, which is almost certainly not the case.  Moreover, he 
seems to suggest that hybridisation (of human and tech) is inevitable and to be 
encouraged, and this too will not be universally embraced.  Having said that, the 
exploration of a theory specifically tailored for the new technological setting is 
valuable, and this is a useful contribution to the techno-moral discourse and to 
scholarship more generally. 
As one works through Magnani’s treatise on morality in a dynamic setting, 
one can expect to be baffled, delighted, bemused, and enlightened in turns, and, as a 
consequence, to be the better for it.  But this is no easy journey, and Magnani’s 
assurance that his approach ‘allow[s] us to reorient and modernize philosophical 
discussions … in a way that avoids the formal treatments of traditional moral 
philosophy,’ (p.248) did not, as it turns out, mean that his theory was any more 
comprehensible (to the non-philosopher) than any of his antecedents.  In short, 
Morality in a Technological World is dense and demanding and suffers from 
inaccessibility, and though this may be the fault of the reviewer’s mind rather than the 
theory or the prose, it is safe to say that this book is not for everyone (indeed it may 
well be that it is not intended for a non-philosophical audience), and one can be 
confident that one would be unable to apply the theory in a practical setting. 
The book’s difficulty is compounded by its structure, which does not flow 
from one topic to the next, building the argument as it goes.  For example, given that 
it was continually referred to throughout, one would have preferred to see the 
methodological content (chapters 6 and 7) at the outset, followed by (1) arguments 
about the importance of knowledge, (2) defences of knowledge as duty, and (3) 
explorations and defences of the new way of treating/conceptualising people within 
the moral evaluative process.  This structural problem may be because the book tries 
to serve multiple ends (e.g. to offer and defend a science-based methodology, to 
explore ‘knowledge as duty’, to reverse thinking about ‘humans as things/means’), 
but structuring it in accordance with those ends would have helped this reviewer. 
To close, it is worth reiterating a concern and highlighting two positives.  
First, one may not be enamoured with Magnani’s approach to instrumentality because 
of the assumptions that appear to underlie it: that technologies, which are often 
contingent and disposable, are widely valued and a good touchstone for defending the 
dignity of humans.  One should be careful about encouraging the equation of dignity 
with such temporally and geographically limited, and often contested, artefacts.  
Harkening back to Kant, one could argue that, despite the consumer, commercial or 
other value we place on these artefacts, this simply devalues humans overmuch, 
ignoring the special status that has been the struggle of centuries to recognise and 
fulfil.  Nevertheless, the broad message contained in this book – that our burgeoning 
knowledge imposes on us multiplying duties and the need to be absolutely vigilant 
about meeting them – is something that can and should be embraced by all.  Although 
the idea of ‘duties’ may not resonate universally, the limitations of ‘rights talk’ is 
starkly exposed by current global disease burdens and the hollowness of the widely 
claimed right to health.  A discourse reliant on duties is both helpful and welcome.  
Additionally, and importantly, Magnani rightly reminds us that we are not entitled to 
forget or ignore the global-scale consequences of our localised actions, nor to reduce 
our moral obligations simply because they are embedded in complex systems 
(whether commercial, political or social) (pp.98-103).  As such, Magnani should be 
congratulated on his attempt to promote knowledge and duty (and knowledge as duty) 
and to contemporise certain elements of moral thinking. 
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